Blue Lake Analysis

Lessons / analysis (please see the full story, below this post):

These are notes that I have made. They are not comprehensive or complete. Please feel free to comment on them.

Stay well clear of cornices, no matter how stable they look. The cornice fall at Blue Lake may have been survivable if it had only been the cornice that fell, but the cornice triggered secondary avalanches on the slope below which contributed to the bulk of the avalanche debris field.

When responding to an emergency - take your pack with you.
When Owen and I rushed over to help we left behind our packs as we had them off at the time. Owen had his gloves off and left his gloves with our packs. When he returned and was helping with the probing he was using some surgical gloves supplied by one of the paramedics. By that time I had retrieved my pack and was able to lend him my heavy duty, wool lined ice climbing gloves.
Later on when we were working we had no water, spare clothes, first aid kit etc. with us. Owen also became cold when we were called off the rescue effort as his clothing was still half a kilometre away where we had lunch. I had a down jacket with me and was able to lend Owen my polar fleece jacket until we picked up his pack.

Take comms when you have the opportunity – Owen, being a trainee Volunteer Ski Patroller, had been advised by his colleagues to take a VSP radio with him. Due to its weight, he elected not to take one with him. If we had had that radio we could have called in the emergency services a lot faster, and would have had extra manpower to work on the search of the avalanche debris field. We both had mobile phones on us, but there was no reception in the vicinity. I also own two small, light wieght 1 watt VHF radios. Due to oversight, I did not take these with me. If I had taken these with me, I would have been able to give one to Owen and kept one with myself, thereby allowing us to stay in communication during the time that he climbed Little Twynam for help. I would also have been able to communicate with him when he found the loose ski on the debris field, rather than wonder where he was and what he was doing after I saw him ski back across to us at the time that the Careflight helicopter appeared.

Pay close attention to any gear that may be on the avalanche debris field and concentrate your search in that area – I did not see the loose ski that Tom had been carrying, even though I carefully scanned the avalanche debris field. When Owen returned from calling the emergency services he noticed the ski and carried out an investigation in the area. He did not inform me (or I do not remember him informing me) when he returned to us that he had seen a ski.

From what I had seen from my perspective of the fall, I had felt that Tom was further down the hill from where we were searching, in the centre of the debris field. I had just finished reading McKay Jenkins' book 'White Death – In the Path of an Avalanche', and knew how difficult it could be to locate someone buried where there were no signs. I could only work on what Peter said he had seen, as he was the closest person to what had happened. I still felt at the time that Tom was located further down. If Owen had been on the scene earlier and noted the position of the loose ski, I would have been more adamant about searching in that area.

On later inspection of photos that I took, I realised that I could have walked out onto a rock formation called 'The Boulder', which was immediately to the south of the avalanche debris field. This would have given me the ability to look down on the avalanche debris field, and I may have spotted Tom's loose ski.

The Careflight chopper, flying close to the top of the cliff line, could have caused further cornice collapse, endangering the rescue team below. The helicopter crew should have been made aware that their downwash from the rotors may have triggered another cornice collapse if they had maneuvered too close to the top of the cliff face that the rescue team was working under.

Not enough probes were brought in fast enough (maybe due to not many being available in one spot)
Owen commented that he emphasised in the initial call to Ski Patrol that we needed personnel and avalanche probes. He was disappointed that not enough probes were delivered in the initial response.

Rescuers did not understand avalanche shoveling technique – when other rescue services personnel arrived some of them began excavating areas where probers indicated the victim may have been. They did not understand avalanche shoveling techniques where a hole should be dug using at least two people – one person doing the main excavation, with another person behind them removing the overburden that has been shoveled out. I attempted to improve their technique at the time.
We had problems with the expandable ski poles coming apart while probing (Black Diamond extendable poles). If I had brought the first aid kit with me, rather than leaving it 500 metres away where we had lunch, I would have been able to use the elastoplast tape to strengthen the poles. It is highly recommended that people use ski poles in the back country that can be easily converted into probes.

Owen should maybe have stayed and search with us, rather than calling in the rescue team. This is a hard one, as if we had found Tom earlier (just Peter and I), and he was requiring immediate evacuation, Owen's decision to call in rescue services could have been justified. On reading avalanche rescue documentation, the more appropriate course of action may have been for Owen to start the search with us, as time was of the essence, and he was the one who noticed the loose ski (one of Tom's) on the avalanche debris field when he returned. If his had occurred earlier, as stronger case could have been made to search in the vicinity of the loose ski. Again, this comment is made in hindsight.

Use ski poles that can be turned into avalanche probes – when buying new ski poles in the previous year, the Paddy Palin sales person suggested that I buy the Black Diamond poles that could convert into avalanche probes. I thought this was what I was buying at the time, but on closer inspection with the sales person it was found that the model they had sold me were not the model that could be converted. I told them not to worry, as when did we have avalanches in Australia?

A safety person should have been placed at the top of the cliff to warn off any onlookers in case they triggered further cornice collapses. There was clear and present danger of another cornice collapse on top of the rescue crew who was operating in the avalanche debris field, especially on the souther side as there was a cornice section that had not collapsed adjacent to Grey Buttress. If this had occurred there was potential for quite a few of the rescue crew to suffer a similar fate to Tom. If some other back country skiers had appeared at the top of the cliff line hoping to get a better view of the rescue activity, another cornice collapse may have been triggered. A safety person should have been stationed at the top of the cliff line, well away from the edge, with the responsibility of keeping any other back country travelers away from the cliff line. Rescue workers were not made aware enough of the imminent danger that was still present. When the policeman on the scene attempted to move everyone to the south of the avalanche debris field so that the snow ploughs could get to work, I loudly voiced my concern that anyone in that area would be in the danger zone. After that, people stayed clear of that area.

Always set the date / time on your camera – this was one of the few times that I had not done this after changing the batteries – the camera will then mark the time for you as you take the photos. I took plenty of photos of the different stages of the rescue attempt, but had difficulty marking the time that certain events occurred. If my camera date and time had been set correctly, the camera would have recorded the events chronologically for me as I took the photos.

Tom's body was found about 2/3 of the way down - from what I had seen I felt he was in that area as well, but his brother watched him fall from about 30 metres away and was adamant that he was in the area we were searching. I scanned the debris field as I climbed up next to it, but saw no indication of any gear on the surface. When Owen returned from calling in the rescue services he saw a loose ski on the debris field and carried out a solo search in the area - Tom was carrying his skis when he fell - this was not communicated effectively to me when he joined the main search, and I would have definitely searched in the area of the ski if I had known. In the end, Tom's body was found not far from the ski. Tom was also found about three metres under the surface, and from what I have read it is unlikely to survive being buried more than a metre deep. We had a good idea of his fall line as there were two marks above the cornice crack line where he tried to grab hold, and there was a well defined vertical slide mark down the first 20 metres where he was attempting to self arrest. I think his brothers estimation of Tom's position was muddled by the fact that at least two secondary avalanches were triggered by the falling cornice, which made a major contribution to the volume of the load and swept him further down the slope.

Probing can be a very time-consuming process if a thorough search is undertaken for a victim without a beacon. In the U.S., 86% of the 140 victims found (since 1950) by probing were already dead. Survival/rescue more than 2 m deep is relatively rare (about 4%). Probes should be used immediately after a visual search for surface clues, in coordination with the beacon search.